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The issue of the minimum wage is often couched as a debate between those arguing the youth disemployment
effects on the one hand and those arguing the potential benefits to those in poverty on the other. Because most
minimum wage earners are teenagers, the argument goes, increasing the minimum wage to assist the poor
would be poorly targeted. A better way to assist the poor is through refundable tax credits like the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC). And yet, this particular focus has obscured some critical issues, mainly that as a
labor market institution the minimum wage may have import for a community's wage structure and that this
import may vary from one region to another. This point is by no means immaterial because opposition to it has
always been stronger in some parts of the country than others. When legislation for the 1938 Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) was being debated, the fiercest opposition came from the South, where wages were
considerably lower than in the industrial north (Nordund 1997).
Opposition to the minimum wage today isn't restricted just to the South, but often emanates specifically from
those states with right-to-work laws – laws that are generally favorable to open shops and are otherwise hostile
to union activity. In this paper I look at those earning around the minimum wage on the basis of regional and
industry distribution. The minimum wage clearly has greater significance in some parts of the country than it
does in others. At issue is just what the significance of the minimum wage might be on a region's wage
structure. In this paper, I look at census data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series ( IPUMS) for
the years 1940 through 1990 in an effort to discern the effects of state type on the probability of earning
around the minimum wage. By conventional wisdom, industry and educational level are critical factors in
determining who is more likely to earn around the minimum wage. As important as they are, the data also
suggest that state type is as important a factor. This is especially so when comparing those states that
specifically are considered "right-to-work" with those that might otherwise be considered high union density.
What I intend to show is that industries that traditionally would be associated with strong negative effects for
earning around the minimum wage have strong positive effects for earning around the minimum wage in
right-to-work states.
These differences and their relative effects are quite important because they provides some insight into why
political resistance to the minimum wage has been so much stronger in some regions than in others. Aside
from questions of culture, history and tradition, the minimum wage cuts to the core of some fundamental
differences between the states — their respective wage structures. Were this issue to be postulated in the form
of a couple of propositions, it might look as follows: The closer a wage floor is to either the average or median
wages of a particular community, the more of a threat it will be to the overall wage structure of that community.
Also the more people there are earning around that wage floor in a given community, the more politically
charged that issue is likely to be. The data in this paper do not test these propositions in a direct way, but the
implications derived from them nonetheless appear to confirm the likelihood of their being true. Moreover, the
impact that the minimum wage may have on a region's relative wage structure should also have implications for
the distribution of income, and the role that labor market institutions like the minimum wage and unions may
play in ensuring a more equitable distribution.
Who Earns the Minimum Wage
The literature on the minimum wage is generally divided into two spheres: one theoretical, the other empirical.
In the theoretical sphere, the minimum wage as a wage floor is considered to be harmful because it will result inless employment. According to the competitive markets model, each worker receives the value of his or her
marginal product. (The value of the marginal product of labor is the amount of increased revenues that result
from an additional unit of labor.) If adding an additional worker results in a greater rise in total revenues than
when the previous worker was added, then the firm's productivity rises by adding that worker. A wage floor,
such as a mandated minimum wage, prevents the cost of labor from dropping below a set rate. If the minimum
wage is higher than the equilibrium wage, fewer workers will be hired than are willing to work; that is there is
unemployment. A minimum wage higher than the equilibrium wage will result either in the layoffs of workers
whose value is less than the minimum or an increase in productivity among low-efficiency workers to justify
their retention by firms (Stigler 1946).
In the empirical sphere, the effects of the minimum wage are not clear. Much of the literature that does exist
suggests that the minimum wage primarily affects the teen labor market ( Kosters and Welch 1972; Welch
1974, 1978; Meyer and Wise 1983; Neumark and Wascher 1992). More recently, however, the work of Card
and Krueger has demonstrated that in a couple of states where the minimum wage was increased, there was no
disemployment effect. Quite to the contrary, employment in the states they examined actually rose (1995;
1998). At the same time, there is a school of thought that maintains that findings such as these are besides the
point. Most of the work force, it is argued, simply do not earn the minimum wage, and thus the minimum wage
is a non-starter.
There are essentially two problems associated with the minimum wage, neither of which are mutually exclusive.
The first problem has to do with problems of measurement and data. In reality, we lack adequate data on the
minimum wage, and thus are not really in a position to say whether the minimum wage will truly have the
disemployment effects usually predicted by models of competitive markets. To the extent that there are
employment consequences, they are often considered to be relatively small (Brown, Kohen and Gilroy 1982).
And as a corollary, there is the argument that just because new studies, such as Card and Krueger, demonstrate
that modest increases haven't had disemployment effects, it still isn't known that there could not be were the
wage to be increased to a certain point. There is still a point at which the minimum wage will bite, but the
problem is that the data and measures currently available don't easily tell us what that point is (R. Freeman and
A. Freeman 1991; Kennan 1995).
On a somewhat related point, studies like Card and Krueger may not be terribly useful because of their focus
the fast food industry, and the fast food industry is essentially a labor monopsony. In the monopsony model,
employers have the power to establish wage rates because as the only source of employment, they possess
market power. Card and Krueger concede that the fast food industry, as the primary employer of minimum
wage workers, is a monopsony. In a monopsony wage floors will generally lead to employment increases,
which is the exact opposite of what happens in competitive labor markets. The firm seeking to maximize profits
has a marginal cost of labor that is equal to the value of the marginal product of labor. Consequently, the
resulting equilibrium wage winds up below what it would have been in an otherwise perfectly competitive
market. In a monopsony, however, a minimum wage will result in greater employment and efficiency because it
will still be less than the equilibrium wage in a perfectly competitive market. As Houseman observes:
"Although this result has been long known, it was generally regarded as a theoretical curiosity because of the
belief that, apart from one-company towns, the monopsony model was not a good description of labor markets
(Houseman 1998, p. 163)."
The second problem, however, has to do with the problems associated with defining what it means to earn the
minimum wage. One of the biggest measurement questions surrounding the minimum wage has to do with
who actually earns the minimum wage. To a large extent, the focus over the last couple of decades on the youth
labor market is a function of teenagers constituting the primary labor market earning the minimum wage.
Because the teen labor market might be the primary earners of the minimum wage, little attention has been paid
to the potential benefits of the minimum wage for assisting the poor. This is perhaps most unfortunate because
it also obscures those potential benefits that might accrue specifically to the working poor (Levitan and Belous
1979).
The principal argument for not focusing on the potential benefits to the poor, however, is that most of the
minimum wage workers are not adults. Much of the data on who earns the minimum wage show that only a
small fraction of the labor force earns it and that most of them are teen-agers. Earners of the minimum wageare for the most part teenagers or contributing members of a household budget (Burkhauser and Finegan
1989). Those who fall into the category of the dependent poor are not currently employed in those jobs, even
though those are the jobs for which they would most likely qualify (Burtless 1995). On these grounds, it is
often concluded that raising the minimum wage would not greatly help the poor, largely because most of the
poor – which might include the homeless population – do not work (Shapiro 1990-91; Burkhauser and
Finegan 1989). And yet, these findings assume a narrow construction of the labor market that earns the
minimum wage. Perhaps the question ought not to be who is actually earning the statutory minimum wage, but
who is earning around the minimum wage. 
Unquestionably, if only a small segment of the labor market is earning the minimum wage, it should be
considered an insignificant issue not terribly relevant to the public debate. And yet, the minimum wage appears
to engender considerable political antagonism. If truly irrelevant, it should matter little either way. Its impact on
the labor market will be negligible because so few people are earning it and its impact on the poverty
population too will be negligible because few in poverty are actually earning the minimum wage. Moreover, as
critics of the minimum wage often concede that recent wage hikes have had no disemployment effects because
the statutory minimum wage is so far below a market clearing wage that it couldn't have an effect (R. Gordon
1995), it is hard to see why the minimum wage receives the attention it does in the public debate. That there is
this level of opposition to the minimum wage would suggest that the minimum wage perhaps affects a larger
population than commonly thought. Or that its symbolism is so powerful that it could influence those wages
around it.
David Gordon has argued that the minimum wage population is very small only if viewed in terms of those
actually earning the statutory minimum wage. Most conventional estimates only look at those earning the
minimum wage at a single point in time. A decline in the real value of the minimum wage, however, also affects
those earning in between the point where the wage used to be and where it is at the end of its decline in value.
This is in addition to those "minimum wage" workers who earn at or below the wage. When viewed in these
terms, a decline in the real minimum wage may be seen as a contributing factor to the wage squeeze and to the
growing income inequality (D. Gordon 1996, 214-215). Galbraith too has suggested that the decline of these
two institutions together should be seen as contributing factors, although the main culprit is the shift in federal
policy after 1970 from full employment to anti-inflation (Galbraith 1998). 
A similar argument was made much earlier by John Dunlop when he suggested that the internal wage structure
of a firm was affected as much by external forces as internal ones. Specifically, if an economy's overall wage
structure could be thought of in terms of wage contours (defined as a group of workers with similar
characteristics working in similar industries), and that in each case there was a group of rates surrounding the
key rate, change in the key rate would have an effect on those surrounding it (Dunlop 1957). If the minimum
wage can be thought of as representing a particular wage contour, those in other contours around it will be
affected by the minimum wage. So to the extent that the minimum wage represents that key rate, they too have a
stake in the minimum wage. If this is true, a strong argument could be made for defining the minimum wage
population in terms of those earning around the statutory minimum wage, which would include a range from
some point below the wage to some point above. 
In their study of the minimum wage William Spriggs and Bruce Klein suggested that the minimum wage's
greatest import was that it served as a reference point for those wages around it. They found that when the
minimum wage remains constant – thus falling in real terms – minimum wage earners' wages are held down.
More important than its impact on employment levels is the role it plays in determining the wages of America's
overall workforce – especially those with only a high school education and those living in rural areas.
Moreover, despite changes in minimum wages, firms merely maintain their internal wage structures. That is,
they view the minimum wage as a reference point for what starting wages ought to be. Although some evidence
might suggest that higher labor turnover relates significantly to increases in employment after minimum wage
changes, increases generally do not have a significant effect overall on employment. Rather the cost of
maintaining low value for the minimum wage is the diminished opportunities for young adult workers during
the 1980s (Spriggs and Klein 1994). This was because those minimum wage jobs available did not afford their
occupants the opportunity to earn a wage above the poverty line. If minimum wages, as they suggest, are a
cultural artifact, the implication might be enormous. Presumably that reference point could be altered, and when
it is altered it will have an impact on those wages around it. More importantly, their findings would appear toreinforce Dunlop's earlier theory of wage contours.
Another problem with the narrow approach to the minimum wage that has been taken thus far is that many of
these studies are based on national averages, which do not take into account regional differences.
Congressional opposition to the minimum wage has tended to be stronger in the South and "right-to-work"
states – even among Democrats whom otherwise vote for increases – than in high union density states where
wage rates on average are considerably higher (Levin-Waldman 1998). Previous studies of wage differentials
between the North and the South have concluded these differentials to be a function of differences in the cost
of living (Coelho and Gladi 1971).
These conclusions, however, are problematic, in part, because they defy logic. Living costs will no doubt have a
part to play in determining how much workers need to earn, but it is the wage rate itself that affects their
purchasing power and ultimately their demand for goods and services. It is probably the case that the higher
one's wages, the more one will demand a higher standard of living. But it doesn't necessarily follow that one
will demand lower wages because the standard of living is lower. Still, the fact that these wage differentials do
exist does beg the question of whether the regional differences are merely a matter of simple economic
differences or other cultural, demographic, political, and even ideological factors that need to be accounted for.
And yet, nobody has undertaken a serious analysis of just how those differences might drive the debate over
minimum wage policy. In the next section, I examine the effects of state type and industry on those earning
around the minimum wage.
Regional Wage Structure
Economists have been looking at the national wage structure for some time now, with particular attention to the
distribution of income. Studies on the declining fortunes of the middle class and stagnant wages are by no
means new (Phillips 1990; Newman 1993; Hungerford 1993; Wolf 1994; Danziger and Gottschalk 1995).
Though sources of rising wage inequality are open to question, they would appear to fall into two primary
camps. One stresses structural changes in the economy which has resulted in a mismatch between good paying
jobs and the skills available to workers. This school of thought suggests that the labor market is divided into a
primary market where high premiums are placed on skilled workers, and a secondary market where unskilled
workers are trapped in the lowest-wage service sector of the economy. And because of the skills differentials
between the primary and secondary labor markets, there has been a growth in wage inequality between the two
(cf. Katz and Murphy 1992; Krueger 1993). But the story isn't only about human capital, it is also about
individual responsibility. Individuals can pass from the secondary labor market into the primary one if through
education and training they upgrade their skills. By definition, then, labor market institutions like the minimum
wage and unions are irrelevant. They only inflate wages beyond the worth of those workers in the secondary
labor market. Therefore, it is incumbent upon them to upgrade their skills so that they can pass from the
secondary labor market to the primary labor market. 
The other school suggests that the growing inequality is due to a shift in public policy and a corresponding
decline in labor market institutions like unions and the minimum wage (Piore 1995; Gordon 1996; Galbraith
1998). Fortin and Lemieux (1997), for instance, found that whereas the decline in unions contributed to
increased wage inequality among men, the decline in the minimum wage contributed to increased wage
inequality specifically among women. And yet the question remains: are there some regions where wages are
more likely to be stagnant than others? And are there some regions where workers are more likely to earn the
minimum wage that others? Moreover, are there any observable trends over time? Demographic profiles can be
drawn from census data with regards to who is more likely to earn around the minimum wage, and through the
IPUMS census microdata is accessible for the period from which the minimum wage was first introduced til
the present. The key question has to do with those earning around the minimum wage and which factors have
either a positive or negative probability for earning around the minimum wage. Because the question concerns
the relative effects of different variables, a logistical regression analysis would be useful. At least on this basis,
it can be determined which factors, region, industry or education level, have a greater effect for earning around
the minimum wage.
My analysis is specifically focused on the period from 1940 to 1990 because that is the period where census
data encompassing the minimum wage period from its inception in 1938 til the present is available. In theIPUMS data set, the sample sizes are different for each census year, ranging from 1.5 million to 3 million
individuals. The data sets are comprised of two files, one a household and one a personal. I have pulled out of
these files those individuals, primarily key income earners in a household who are employed and who
specifically work for wages. Although this reduces the sample sizes, they still range from 225,000 in 1940 to
over 660,000 in 1990.
The easiest way to construct a model for analyzing regional differences is to divide the states between those
that are specifically right-to-work and those that are high union density. Right-to-work states are those that
specifically have legislation favorable to businesses, and often hostile to unionizing activities. Although some
right-to-work states might have relatively high union densities, most have relatively low ones because
unionization is considerably more difficult. Today union density in most cases doesn't exceed 30 percent and
often hovers around 15-25 percent in the most heavily of unionized states. A distribution of unionization for
1996 can be seen in Table 1.
Table 1 Percentage of Unionized Workers
Right-to-work Middle High Union Density
Alabama (13.6) Colorado (9.9) Alaska (24.1)
Arizona (8.0) Delaware (13.0) California (17.7)
Arkansas (7.8) Kentucky (12.6) Connecticut (20.2)
Florida (7.3) Maryland (14.9) D.C. (15.1)
Georgia (6.8) Missouri (14.6) Hawaii (24.6)
Idaho (8.1) New Hampshire (12.6) Illinois (20.2)
Iowa (12.1) New Mexico (9.4) Indiana (16.5)
Kansas (10.2) Oklahoma (9.3) Maine (15.6)
Louisiana (7.0) Vermont (9.3) Massachusetts (16.2) 
Mississippi (5.2)   Michigan (23.7)
Nebraska (9.1)   Minnesota (20.3)
Nevada (20.2)   Montana (15.8)
North Carolina (4.2)   New Jersey (21.9)
North Dakota (10.0)   New York (27.7)
South Carolina (3.3)   Ohio (18.5)
South Dakota (7.7)   Oregon (20.1)
Tennessee (9.5)   Pennsylvania (18.9)
Texas (6.5)   Rhode Island (19.4)
Utah (9.0)   Washington (21.0)
Virginia (6.7)   West Virginia (16.3)
Wyoming (11.2)   Wisconsin (17.7)
Source: Drawn from Table 8 in Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson, Union Membership
and Earnings Data Book: Compilations from the Current Population Survey (1996 Edition) .
Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1996, pp. 22—23. 
Although this table merely represents a snapshot in time, it nonetheless provides a reference point for the
division of states into state types into three categories: "right-to-work," middle and high union density. For the
exception of Nevada, all the "right-to-work" states have union densities below 14 percent. High union density
states have union densities in excess of 15 percent. Those states that are neither "right-to-work" nor have union
densities higher than 15 percent, fall into a middle category. But even among this middle category, there are
some states with union densities similar to some of the "right-to-work" states.
One possible methodological objection might be that instead of dividing the states into right-to-work versus
high union density, they simply be divided into low union density versus high-union density. It is certainly true
that right-to-work states will for the most part have low union densities because of laws that are hostile tounionizing activities. But a low union density state by itself doesn't necessarily capture the spirit of a political,
legal, and economic structure that is hostile to unions. The point is to demonstrate that because certain states
have a particular hostility to unions and other wage enhancing institutions, there is perhaps a greater likelihood
of wages being lower. The goal of the analysis, then, is to specifically compare right-to-work states to high
union density states and show the relative impact of each on wage structure as a basis for inferring why the
minimum wage appears to have greater significance is some places as opposed to others. 
Because I want to look at those earning around the minimum wage, I have constructed a uniform range from 50
percent below the statutory minimum to 50 percent above. Table 2 shows the relative percentages of those
earning around the minimum wage according to this construction.

















1940 29.9 37.0 7.1 27.5 26.7 3.2 35.6
1950 28.4 36.2 7.8 25.6 24.6 3.8 35.0
1960 19.3 26.5 7.2 16.4 15.7 3.6 25.2
1970 17.0 22.8 5.8 14.5 13.8 3.2 21.8
1980 19.7 23.7 4.0 17.8 17.3 2.4 22.7
1990 14.2 16.8 2.6  8.4 12.4 1.8 16.4
Note: On the basis of chi-square tests, all are significant at the 95% confidence level. 
When the minimum wage is conceived of in terms of the broader definition, a not so insignificant segment of
the labor force earns around the minimum wage. Although it is true that the percentages of wage earners
earning around the minimum wage drops over time, it is still considerably larger than the percentages of those
solely earning the statutory minimum wage. Also, the percentages of those earning around the minimum wage
are both substantially higher in right-to-work states than overall and lower in high union density states than
overall. Again, while these percentages narrow over the fifty year period, the overall trends nonetheless hold.
The fact that the trend continues to hold at the end of this period is especially important, as it follows a period
of intensive economic development, especially in the South, which as a region passed right-to-work laws. These
efforts at economic development, for which the minimum wage figures prominently as a policy tool, were
designed to replace low-wage and low-skilled industries with higher wage industries (Wright 1986; Schulman
1991).
Contemporary critics of the minimum wage often claim that most of those earning the minimum wage are
teenagers. But as Table 3 makes clear the highest percentage of those earning around the minimum wage are in
the 25-34 age cohort, and the percentages of those earning around the minimum wage in that cohort are higher
in the right-to-work states than they are in the high union density states. It is true that as time passes, the
percentage of those in the 18-24 age cohort increases, but most workers earning around the minimum wage are
clearly adults. Table 3 Comparative Demographics on Age, Education and Industry
Age 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
  Rtw Hu RTW HU RTW HU RTW HU RTW HU RTW HU
  0-17 .1 .1 .2 .1 .3 .3 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 
18-24 12.0 11.5 15.8 12.5 19.7 18.6 24.4 25.4 24.5 23.5 18.4 19.2
25-34 33.2 25.0 26.7 23.1 22.1 18.3 19.0 16.9 27.8 27.9 25.3 23.7
35-44 25.6 23.9 25.3 20.1 19.2 16.3 15.4 12.9 14.1 13.9 18.0 17.4
44-54 17.6 23.2 17.2 19.5 19.6 18.0 17.4 18.9 13.2 12.4 12.7 11.7
55-64 8.8 14.8 10.9 17.4 13.9 17.8 4.6 7.0 13.3 14.1 13.3 13.3 
65-72 2.3 3.6 3.3 6.2 4.1 8.3 1.5 2.7 5.4 6.1 8.4 10.2
73 + .4 .7 .6 1.2 1.1 2.5 .6 1.3 1.6 1.9 3.7 4.3
Education 
1-11th grade 84.2 82.9 78.8 72.1 70.3 63.8 57.5 47.4 37.9 30.1 36.9 28.7 
12th grade 10.0 11.4 13.5 18.5 19.3 21.9 25.9 30.1 36.7 38.8 45.4 47.9
1-4 years college 3.7 3.5 4.7 5.7 6.8 8.7 10.9 13.8 16.4 18.8 5.4 7.0
4 years college 1.6 1.4 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.9 3.7 4.6 5.3 6.6 8.8 11.0
more than
4 years .6 .7 .9 1.4 1.3 2.6 2.1 4.1 1.5 2.9 3.4 5.4
*All are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
Although educational attainment does increase over time, irrespective of state type, there is surprisingly an
increase of those with 1-4 years of college earning around the minimum wage. Still, as to be expected, greater
percentages of those with lower levels of education appear to be more likely to earn around the minimum wage.
The critical point about the education variable is that the educational levels of those earning around the
minimum wage are lower in the right-to-work states than they are in the high union density states.
Assuming that low education would more likely predispose one to earn around the minimum wage, the critical
question is what are the effects relative to the other variables? A logistical regression analysis can demonstrate
quite well just what the relative effects are. With earning around the minimum wage (MNWAGE) as the
dependent variable, I have set up four different equations for each year. The independent variables are as
follows:
LOEDUCAT = those with an educational level between 1st and 11th grade.
HU = high union density states
RTW = right to work states
MANUFACT = manufacturing
RETRADE = retail trade
WLTRADE = wholesale trade
CONSTRUC = construction
HULOED = interaction between low education and high union density states
RTWLOED = interaction between low education and right-to-work states
RTWMANUF = interaction between manufacturing and right-to-work states
HUMANUF = interaction between manufacturing and high union density states
RTWRETRD = interaction between retail trade and right-to-work states
HURETRD = interaction between retail trade and high union density states
RTWWLTRD = interaction between wholesale trade and right-to-work states
HUWLTRD = interaction between wholesale trade and high union density States
Table 4 presents the results of two regression equations. The first shows the relationship between low
education, industry and state type. The second shows the relationship between industry and the interaction
between low education and state type. All equations are based on each variable 
being set to a value of 1.Table 4 Logistical Regression Results by Industry, Education and State Type 
1940
Variable B Sig Variable B Sig
LOEDUCAT .7312 .0000 HULOED .4270 .0000
HU -.2548 .0000 RTWLOED .8568 .0000
RTW .1902 .0000 WLTRADE -.1786 .0000
MANUFACT -.0214 .0654 RETRADE -.6670 .0000
RETRADE -.4179 .0000 MANUFACT -.2321 .0000
WLTRAD .0317 .0343 Constant -1.1253 .0000
CONSTRUC .7495 .0000   
Constant -1.3911 .0000  
1950
LOEDUCAT .7664 .0000 HULOED .4176 .0000 
HU -.3230 .0000 RTWLOED .9639 .0000
RTW .1693 .0000 WLTRADE .0835 .0001 
MANUFACT -.1743 .0000 RETRADE -.1335 .0037 
RETRADE -.0648 .1623 MANUFACT -.1927 .0000 
WLTRADE .1009 .0000 Constant -1.2320 .0000
CONSTRUC
Constant -1.2457 .0000  
1960
LOEDUCAT .5648 .0000 HULOED .2361 .0000
HU -.3039 .0000 RTWLOED .9240 .0000 
RTW .3029 .0000 WLTRADE -.3659 .0000
MANUFACT -.4131 .0000 RETRADE .2736 .0000
RETRADE .2668 .0000 MANUFACT -.4267 .0000
WLTRADE -.3601 .0000 Constant -1.5938 .0000
CONSTRUC -.0411 .0051  
Constant -1.5877 .0000  
1970
LOEDUCAT .4883 .0000 HULOED .1615 .0000
HU -.3222 .0000 RTWLOED .8440 .0000
RTW .2340 .0000 WLTRADE -.3866 .0000
MANUFACT -.4048 .0000 RETRADE .2279 .0000
RETRADE .1830 .0000 MANUFACT -.3803 .0000
WLTRADE -.4233 .0000 Constant -1.6816 .0000 
CONSTRUC -.3030 .0000  
Constant -1.5855 .0000  
1980
LOEDUCAT .4765 .0000 HULOED .2849 .0000
HU -.1599 .0000 RTWLOED .6960 .0000 
RTW .1894 .0000 WLTRADE -.3049 .0000
MANUFACT -.4116 .0000 RETRADE .3183 .0000
RETRADE .2953 .0000 MANUFACT -.4015 .0000 
WLTRADE -.3226 .0000 Constant -1.4530 .0000 
CONSTRUC -.1625 .0000  
Constant -1.4345 .0000  
1990
LOEDUCAT  .7559 .0000 HULOED .5635 .0000 HU -.1820 .0000 RTWLOED .9377 .0000 
RTW .1181 .0000 WLTRADE -.3914 .0000
MANUFACT -.4782 .0000 RETRADE .5700 .0000
RETRADE .5417 .0000 MANUFACT -.4622 .0000
WLTRADE -.4112 .0000 Constant -1.9076 .0000
CONSTRUC -.1858 .0000  
Constant -1.8546 .0000  
What the fist equation shows is the effects of each of these variables by themselves. As to be expected low
education has a strong positive effect for earning around the minimum wage, an effect that is consistent
throughout the fifty year time period. Manufacturing by itself has a negative effect while other industries have
different effects in different decades. In 1940, for instance, retail has a negative effect for earning around the
minimum wage, but by 1960 it becomes positive and remains so through 1990. On the other hand both
wholesale trade and construction have positive effects for earning around the minimum wage in 1940, but
beginning in 
1960 they become negative and remain so through 1990. In terms of state type, both right-to- work and high
union density status have positive and negative effects respectively for earning around the minimum wage, and
they too remain consistent throughout the period. On the basis of the first equation, it should be clear that low
education appears to have the strongest positive effects for earning around the minimum wage, and this is
followed by industry type.
The critic, then, will naturally say that when compared to educational attainment — regardless of whether or not
it says anything about skills level — state type doesn't appear to be nearly as significant. But the interaction
between low education and state type in the second equation would appear to suggest otherwise. When
controlling for the effects of low education, those in right-to-work states have a greater probability of earning
around the minimum wage than those in high union density states, and this trend does remain consistent
throughout the period. The interaction between low education and being in a right-to-work state has at least 2-3
times the positive effect than the interaction between low education and being in a high union density state.
Even though being from a high union density state by itself has a negative effect for earning around the
minimum wage, having a low educational level even in a high union density state will mean that one is more
likely to earn around the minimum wage. But that likelihood is considerably stronger in right-to-work states.
Although some industries are more likely to result in their workers earning around the minimum wage, the
question remains as to just how the location of these industries in certain types of states affects whether one is
likely to earn around the minimum wage. Table 5 shows the relationship within industries. Industry
demographics showed there to be no real difference in distribution between right-to-work and high union
density states. In other words, there was no evidence of a saturation of any specific industries that might result
in the depression of wages. Nevertheless, regional differences did affect pay levels.
Table 5 Logistical Regression Results Within Industries 
1940
Variable B Sig Variable B Sig
RTW .0615 .0010 RTW .0501 .1843
RTWMANUF .6305 .0000 RTWMANUF .6313 .0000
MANUFACT -.1405 .0001 MANUFACT -.1888 .0000
HU -.2051 .0000 HU -.2280 .0000
HUMANUF -.1778 .0000 HUMANUF -.1915 .0000
Constant -.7047   RTWLOED .0003 .9934
  HULOED .0422 .2702
  LOEDUCAT .8006 .0000
  Constant -1.3040 .0000
 
RTW .1963 .0000 RTW .1553 .0000
RTWRETRD -.0455 .6799 RTWRETRD .0801 .4756RETRADE -.5141 .0000 RETRADE -.3621 .0001
HU -.2678 .0000 HU -.2777 .0000
HURETRD -.2282 .0196 HURETRD -.2427 .0144
Constant -.7183 .0000 RTWLOED .0357 .3921
  HULOED .0117 .7598
  LOEDUCAT .7798 .0000
  Constant -1.3159 .0000
 
RTW .1964 .0000 RTW  .1447 .0002
RTWWLTRD .0165 .7350 RTWWLTRD .0626 .2064
WLTRADE -.0274 .5058 WLTRADE .0438 .2956
HU -.2536 .0000 HU -.2592 .0000
HUWLTRD -.1803 .0001 HUWLTRD -.1992 .0000
Constant -.7291 .0000 RTWLOED .0440 .2908
  HULOED .0100 .7945
  LOEDUCAT .7931 .0000
  Constant -1.3421 .0000
1950
RTW .0994 .0010 RTW .0776 .1320
RTWMANUF .4459 .0000 RTWMANUF .4429 .0000
MANUFACT -.1391 .0115 MANUFACT -.2325 .0000
HU -.2839 .0000 HU -.1643 .0005
HUMANUF -.1436 .0147 HUMANUF -.1212 .0433
Constant -.7359 .0000 RTWLOED -.0182 .7621
  HULOED -.1519 .0041
  LOEDUCAT .8666 .0000
  Constant -1.2886 .0000
 
RTW .1986 .0000 RTW .1466 .0040
RTWRETRD .0526 .1747 RTWRETRD .0883 .6201
RETRADE -.4901 .0008 RETRADE -.2925 .0492
HU -.3618 .0000 HU -.2420 .0000
HURETRD .4211 .0069 HURETRD .3619 .0225
Constant -2.2219 .0000 RTWLOED .0251 .6752 
  HULOED -.1640 .0030
  LOEDUCAT .8383 .0000
  Constant -1.3141 .0000
 
RTW .2439 .0000 RTW .1880 .0003
RTWWLTRD -.2575 .0003 RTWWLTRD -.2199 .0025
WLTRADE .2795 .0000 WLTRADE .3159 .0000
HU -.3269 .0000 HU -.1998 .0000
HUWLTRD -.1418 .0338 HUWLTRD -.1391 .0409
Constant -.8122 .0000 RTWLOED .0197 .7420
  HULOED -.1769 .0013
  LOEDUCAT .8551 .0000
  Constant -1.3843 .0000
1960
RT .2380 .0000 RTW .1035 .0000
RTWMANUF .3736 .0000 RTWMANUF .3629 .0000
MANUFACT -.4531 .0000 MANUFACT -.5040 .0000
HU -.2767 .0000 HU -.2661 .0000
HUMANUF -.0876 .0073 HUMANUF -.0781 .0175
Constant -1.2298 .0000 RTWLOED .1891 .0000  HULOED -.0120 .6583
  LOEDUCAT .5097 .0000
  Constant -1.5180 .0000
 
RTW .3351 .0000 RTW .1765 .0000
RTWRETRD .1525 .0002 RTWRETRD -.1317 .0012
RETRADE .4526 .0000 RETRADE .4407 .0000
HU -.3510 .0000 HU -.3421 .0000 
HURETRD .0267 .4890 HURETRD .0375 .3328
Constant -1.3807 .0000 RTWLOED .2213 .0000
  HULOED -.0158 .5585
  LOEDUCAT .4700 .0000
  Constant -1.6551 .0000
 
RTW .3133 .0000 RTW .1595 .0000
RTWWLTRD .1616 .0482 RTWWLTRD .1968 .0167
WLTRADE -.3766 .0000 WLTRADE -.3458  .0000
HU -.3495 .0000 HU -.3363 .0000
HUWLTRD -.0192 .8123 HUWLTRD -.0015 .8871
Constant -1.3152 .0000 RTWLOED .2152 .0000
  HULOED -.0212 .4311
  LOEDUCAT .4721 .0000
  Constant -1.5932 .0000
1970
RTW .1855 .0000 RTW .0751 .0001
RTWMANUF .3135 .0000 RTWMANUF .2950 .0000
MANUFACT -.3841 .0000 MANUFACT -.4231 .0000
HU -.2959 .0000 HU -.2663 .0000
HUMANUF -.1050 .0008 HUMANU -.1052 .0008
Constant -1.3892 .0000 RTWLOED .1822 .0000
  HULOED -.0489 .0492
  LOEDUCAT .4323 .0000
  Constant -1.5728 .0000
 
RTW .2693 .0000 RTW .1435 .0000
RTWRETRD -.1599 .0000 RTWRETRD -.1519 .0000
RETRADE .3569 .0000 RETRADE .3413 .0000
HU -.3785 .0000 HU .3454 .0000
HURETRD .1240 .0004 HURETRD .1317 .0002
Constant -1.5149 .0000 RTWLOED .2040 .0000
  HULOED -.0686 .0056
  LOEDUCAT .4008 .0000
  Constant -1.6905 .0000
 
RTW .2441 .0000 RTW .1210 .0000
RTWWLTRD .1463 .0416 RTWWLTRD .1600 .0264
WLTRADE -.4439 .0000 WLTRADE -.4310 .0000
HU -.3659 .0000 HU -.3314 .0000
HUWLTRD .1116 .1132 HUWLTRD .1101 .1189
Constant -1.4518 .0000 RTWLOED .1990 .0000
  HULOED -.0692 .0051
  LOEDUCAT .4050 .0000
  Constant -1.6318 .0000
1980RTW .1629 .0000 RTW .1220 .0000
RTWMANUF .2223 .0000 RTWMANUF .2106 .0000
MANUFACT -.4179 .0000 MANUFACT -.4572 .0000
HU -.1469 .0000 HU -.1384 .0000
HUMANUF -.0754 .0031 HUMANUF -.0830 .0012
Constant -1.2877 .0000 RTWLOED .0728 .0014
  HULOED .0090 .6853
  LOEDUCAT .4413 .0000
  Constant -1.4020 .0000
 
RTW .2281 .0000 RTW .1780 .0000
RTWRETRD -.154 .0000 RTWRETRD -.1437 .0000
RETRADE .4495 .0000 RETRADE .4397 .0000
HU -.2055 .0000 HU -.1964 .0000
HURETRD .1010 .0004 HURETRD .1044 .0003
Constant -1.4340 .0000 RTWLOED .0935 .0000
  HULOED -.0125 .5735
  LOEDUCAT .4019 .0000
  Constant -1.5441 .0000
 
RTW .2083 .0000 RTW .1614 .0000
RTWWLTRD .0107 .8467 RTWWLTRD .0120 .8278
WLTRADE -.2807 .0000 WLTRADE -.2744 .0000
HU -.1924 .0000 HU -.1827 .0000
HUWLTRD .0379 .4802 HUWLTRD .0453 .3992
Constant -1.3638 .0000 RTWLOED .0871 .0001
  HULOED -.0141 .5248
  LOEDUCAT .4073 .0000
  Constant -1.4769 .0000
1990
RTW .1266 .0000 RTW .0808 .0000
RTWMANUF  .1172 .0004 RTWMANUF .0874 .0081
MANUFACT -.4812 .0000 MANUFACT -.5181 .0000
HU -.1719 .0000 HU -.1669 .0000
HUMANUF -.1140 .0000 HUMANUF -.1258 .0001
Constant -1.6583   RTWLOED .1059 .0002
  HULOED .0362 .1949
  LOEDUCAT .6968 .0000
  Constant -1.7790 .0000
 
RTW .1632 .0000 RTW .1082 .0000
RTWRETRD -.1559 .0000 RTWRETRD -.1409 .0000
RETRADE .7493 .0000 RETRADE .7326 .0000
HU -.2176 .0000 HU -.2132 .0000
HURETRD .0236 .4140 HURETRD .0253 .3832
Constant -1.8566 .0000 RTWLOED .1157 .0000
  HULOED .0135 .6301
  LOEDUCAT .6547 .0000
  Constant -1.9729 .0000
 
RTW .1414 .0000 RTW .0916 .0000
RTWWLTRD -.0555 .3965 RTWWLTRD -.0445 .4986
WLTRADE -.3991 .0000 WLTRADE -.3902 .0000
HU -.2145 .0000 HU -.2096 .0000
HUWLTRD .0384 .5471 HUWLTRD .0374 .5588Constant -1.7224 .0000 RTWLOED .0986 .0004
  HULOED .0127 .6485
  LOEDUCAT .6702 .0000
  Constant -1.8445 .0000
Even those industries, like manufacturing, which by itself would ordinarily have a negative effect for earning
around the minimum wage, have a positive effect for earning around the minimum wage when located in
right-to-work states. And conversely, the negative effects for earning around the minimum wage are initially
stronger in high union density states than overall. Over the years that trend reverses, which could be a function
of two possibilities: The first possibility is the general decline of unionism in those regions. And the second is
that the prominence of manufacturing in those regions may have diminished. Still, in each industry, there are
still substantial differences in effects between being in a right-to-work state and being in a high union density
state.
The fact remains that by 1990 manufacturing in right-to-work states still had a positive effect for earning
around the minimum wage, even though that effect was not as serious as it was in 1940. One, of course, might
respond that this may be accounted for by differences in the type of manufacturing. That the strength of the
effect has declined over this period may be a testament to the growth of high-wage and high-technology
industries in many right-to-work states, especially those in the South, where much of the "New Economy" was
a product of "military Keynesianism (Schulman 1991, p. 107)." By 1990 there were fewer low wage industries
than there were in 1940. But this cannot fully explain the differences between right-to-work and high union
density states. Despite the decline in unionism, and capital flight from the northeastern and midwestern
industrial belts, which resulted primarily in the loss of union jobs, there was little change in the negative effects
of manufacturing in high union density states from 1940 to 1990.
Implications
The differences in effect as a function of working in high union density states over right-to-work states would
suggest that there are clearly differences in regional wage structure. Labor market institutions that affect wages,
like unions and the minimum wage, are likely to have more import on wage structure, especially on those wages
around the minimum wage, in right-to-work states where wages have traditionally been lower. If unions are
more difficult to organize in the right-to-work states, the minimum wage effectively becomes the only labor
market institution that can serve to prop up wages, especially for those at the bottom end of the scale. As
Galbraith suggests, minimum wages and unions effectively give workers a degree of monopoly power they
otherwise would not have. In the absence of all workers to be unionized, the minimum wage offers a modicum
of monopoly power to workers, especially in low- wage and low-skilled labor markets to in effect counter
balance the monopoly power of employers. "Minimum wage laws can move people en masse from the
crowded first floor toward the second or third in our wage building (Galbraith 1998, p. 61)." That states
actually passed laws aimed at making unionization more difficult would imply that they sought to maintain the
monopoly power of employers at the expense of workers. This would also suggest that they have an even
greater stake resisting the minimum wage. To the extent that through a wage floor it may offer workers a slight
modicum of monopoly power, or an attempt to provide them access to some, it must be resisted. It should also
be remembered that whereas right-to-work laws are promulgated from within as a matter of "states rights," the
minimum wage, and its periodic adjustment, are imposed from without and are viewed as an attempt to interfere
with state sovereignty. It is often for this reason alone that the minimum wage is often resisted in the public
policy debate.
Nevertheless, there are issues of regional equity that need to be addressed. One of the reasons why northern
industrial states, most of which are high union density states, favor increases in the minimum wage is because it
will force up wages in other parts of the country, thereby making capital mobility to those regions less
attractive, especially if wage differentials are a factor in such decisions. Indeed, these concerns were voiced
during the initial debate over the FLSA in the 1930s. Among those earlier debates was the question of whether
there should be cost-of-living differentials. The Roosevelt administration, backed by organized labor and even
business interests supportive of the measure, refused to incorporate them. To this day there are no regional
differences based on cost-of-living differentials. Instead states are free to establish higher wage rates over and
above the national wage floor. Although some states have seized upon this opportunity over the years, manyhave not. Nevertheless, the fact that wages are lower in right-to-work states implies that a wage floor could have
a greater impact there. This, of course, begs the question: would the cost of living not be higher in those
regions where wages are also higher? The gap between the statutory minimum wage and the median hourly
wage in the right-to-work states isn't as great as it might be in the high union density states.
These differences might suggest the need to think of how the minimum wage could be used to equalize
disparities between the states. From a national perspective, there is no gain from states stealing industry away
from other states, especially if the federal government will have to bear the burden of providing assistance to
those regions that lose industries as a function of the wage differentials. At the same time, the policymaker
might want to be mindful of cost-of-living differentials between regions and attempt to avoid exacerbating
them. Therefore, the policymaker might want to think in terms of different minimum wages for different
regions. This doesn't mean that the statutory minimum wage should be reduced in those regions, but that it
should perhaps be higher in high union density states where the gap between the statutory minimum wage and
the median hourly wage is considerably greater. This might then have the virtue of narrowing the earnings gap
as well. It is also perhaps on this level that the minimum wage ought to be conceived – as a viable policy for
narrowing the earnings gap. If anything, these findings suggest that if policies like right-to-work laws can have
the effect of maintaining low wages, with the effect of perhaps widening the earnings gap, then policies like the
minimum wage can have the effect of raising those wages, with the effect of perhaps narrowing that gap. There
is a difference between opposing minimum wage increases because of the belief that in competitive markets it
will lower employment and opposing it because the suppression of the minimum wage might have the effect of
favoring one region of the country with investment over another. Admittedly, this is an issue that state and local
policymakers might want to be concerned with, but the national policymaker ought to remain region neutral. 
Overall, however, the data would appear to clue us into why the minimum wage does engender the type of
antagonism it often does, and why more so in some regions of the country than others. The minimum wage
itself isn't as important as what it represents for those wages around it. To this extent, the minimum wage
merely represents a tangible symbol for those wages around it. And this is all the more so in those regions with
lower wage structures, like the right-to-work states. Politically, opposition to the minimum wage has always
been greater in the South and other right-to-work states, which owes to the fact that wages in those areas have
always been lower. That the impact is greater in these regions can be seen in the political fights between them
would imply the propositions I put forth at the beginning of the paper are indeed true. Moreover, the findings
that the minimum wage does have greater impact in one region over another also suggests that the minimum
wage can be conceived of in the broader terms of income distribution rather than the narrow focus of
employment consequences versus possible poverty benefits. That the debate has taken this narrow focus is
perhaps less a statement of the weaknesses of the minimum wage per se, but a testament to the strength of
those interests that benefit from maintaining such a narrow focus.
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